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the existence, amount, and provisions of a liability insurance policy covering
the injury in question.
William S. Clark*
Member, Second Year class.
LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS:
Exemptions from Creditor's Claims
Some one hundred twenty-seven million Americans-about seven-tenths
of the nation's population-owned life insurance totaling six hundred billion
dollars as of the end of 1959. California ranked second behind New York
in both the number of people owning life insurance and the amount of life
insurance outstanding.' One reason for this growth of life insurance is that
most jurisdictions have enacted statutes which exempt life insurance pro-
ceeds from creditors' claims. For the most part these statutes vary with each
jurisdiction, but their purpose is the same, viz., to secure to the dependents
of the assured some degree of maintenance and thus fulfill, to a degree, the
moral duty of protection which the insured owes to his family. As stated by
Professor Cooley:
2
All statutes bearing on the exemption of life policies or their proceeds seem
based on the theory that, in the absence of an expressed contrary intent, the
object of an ordinary life insurance policy should be considered as the protection
of the insured's family after his death, and this object and desire is laudable and
in accord with public policy.
The majority of jurisdictions confine the exemption to policies in which a
designated person is named beneficiary. However this view is not followed
in California where the first paragraph of the controlling statute3 flatly ex-
empts from the claims of creditors all moneys, benefits, privileges or immu-
nities accruing or in any manner growing out of any life insurance policy
to the extent that the annual premium does not exceed five hundred dollars.
:'INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BooK (1960).
2 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON INSURANCE 6508 (2d ed. 1928).
3CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 690.19: "All moneys, benefits, privileges or immunities ac-
cruing or in any manner growing out of any life insurance, if the annual premiums paid
do not exceed $500, or if they exceed that sum a like exemption shall exist which shall
bear the same proportion to the moneys, benefits, privileges and immunities so accruing
or growing out of such insvrance that said $500 bears to the whole annual premiums paid.
"In addition to the foregoing, all moneys, benefits, or privileges belonging to or ac-
cruing to the benefit of the insured's spouse or minor children growing out of life in-
surance purchased with annual premiums not exceeding $500, or if such annual premiums
exceed that sum, a like exemption shall exist in favor of such persons which shall bear
the same proportion to the moneys, benefits or privileges growing out of such insurance
that $500 bears to the whole annual premium paid."
This section must be read with § 690 which provides "[such] property . . . is ex-
empt from execution or attachment, except as therein otherwise specially provided, when
claim for exemption is made to the same by the judgment debtor or defendant ..."
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This article is to deal with whether, under the California statute, the
exemption is applicable when the insurance policy is made payable to the
insured's estate, executors or adr~inistrators.
During the insured's life there is usually no incentive for a creditor to
attempt to reach the unmatured policy unless there is a cash surrender value
represented. However, in California when a cash surrender value is present,
and the annual premiums do not exceed the statutory limit, such cash value
is not accessible to the assured's creditors during his lifetime even where the
policy on maturity would be payable to his "estate," "heirs" or the adminis-
trator or the executor of the insured.' Such is also true in other jurisdictions
having statutes exempting policies designating the estate or administrator or
executor as beneficiary,5 but California, by giving broad interpretation to
the statute, has reached this result entirely by judicial fiat. This seems sound
policy since it offers financial protection to the insured and his family. If the
insured's right were turned over to the creditors, he would have no further
interest in keeping the policy alive by the payment of premiums, while the
creditor would willingly let the policy lapse for nonpayment accepting the
lapsed value in discharge of his claim. Hence the benevolent purpose of
the exemption statute, viz., saving debtors and their families from want by
reason of misfortune or improvidence 6 would be defeated.
But a question arises as to whether such a policy remains exempt from
creditors claims upon the death of the insured. Here, unlike the case of un-
matured policies, there is definitely an incentive for creditors to attempt to
reach it. Under most of the exemption statutes the proceeds of such a policy
are not exempt but are liable for the debts of the assured.7 Again however,
in California the proceeds of insurance payable to the estate, administrator
or executor are exempt from the debts of the insured8 within the 500 dollar
statutory limit, when the benefits therefrom inure to the surviving spouse,
minor child or assimilated statutory beneficiary. The leading case in point
is In re Miller's Estate,9 where, since the deceased's annual premiums did
not exceed the statutory limit, the supreme court afiTed the order setting
apart the property to the widow as exempt from execution although the
proceeds were payable to deceased's administrators or executors. The court
41n re Driscoll, 142 F. Supp. 300 (S.D. Cal. 1956). In this case a bankrupt had
been ordered to pay the trustee amounts equal to loans he had negotiated on the security
of his life insurance, which had been repaid two weeks prior to the filing of a petition of
voluntary bankruptcy. The United States district court reversed this decision holding that
since the Bankruptcy Act provides that statutes which create exemptions from execution
in the state where the bankrupt resides determine the property which a bankrupt may
retain as exempt. Since the California statute only limits the amount of exempt insurance
by a limitation on the amount of the annual premium, and the premiums in question did
not exceed the $500 limit, such insurance should be exempt.
5 Se Ilob v. Mall, 187 Iowa 193, 174 N.W. 226 (1919); Schuler v. Johnson, 61 S.D.
141, 246 N.W. 632 (1933).
0 1n re Millington, 63 Cal. App. 498, 218 Pac. 1022 (1923).
7 E.g., Elsom v. Gadd, 93 Wash. 603, 161 Pac. 483 (1916).
8 It is interesting to note that the creditors could be those of deceased or of the
beneficiary since the exemption in California applies not only to the debts of the insured
but also to those of the beneficiary. Holmes v. Marshall, 145 Cal. 777, 79 Pac. 534
(1905).
9 121 Cal. 353, 53 Pac. 906 (1898).
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applied section 1465 of the Code of Civil Procedure- by reasoning that the
policy payable to the insured after death is the same, practically speaking,
as that payable to the estate, administrators, executors, or assigns; and since
his widow had been appointed administratrix and there had been no assign-
ments she was entitled to the exemption. These insurance proceeds, since
they were exempt property, were capable of being set aside for the widow
at the discretion of the court. Again in Holmes v. Marshall" where an order
had been granted the deceased's wife establishing the proceeds of three
insurance policies as exempt property even though one of the policies was
payable to deceased's estate, administrators or executors, the supreme court,
in affirming the decision, stated:"'
We can see no reason why the insurance money coming to her directly as bene-
ficiary should be exempt and not that coming to her directly through the estate
and the order setting it apart. In either case it is exempt from execution. In
one case the instrument of life insurance gives her the title, in the other case
the law gives it to her."3
The older cases have construed such policies payable to the estate, ad-
ministrator or executor of insured as exempt from the claims of creditors
only if the proceeds actually inured to the benefit of the surviving spouse
or minor child. This result was achieved through the use of section 1465 of
the Code of Civil Procedure which had been stated to be the underlying
benevolent purpose of the exemption statute.14 Hence, when deceased left
surviving as his only heirs children who had reached majority, they were not
entitled to the benefit of the exemption when the insurance policy was pay-
able to his executors, administrators and assigns. 15 An example of the court's
reluctance to extend this exemption any further than to the surviving spouse
or minor child was In re Pillsbury's Estate"' where deceased who died simul-
taneously with his wife left insurance policies payable to his wife and if she
predeceased him to his executors, administrators or assigns. Here the brother
of the deceased adopted his children before letters of administration were
issued to another. The court held that although the adoption did not affect
the status of the children as heirs of deceased it did cause them to cease to
be of the family of deceased; and consequently such minor children ceased
to be of the class for which the property could be set aside as exempt from
execution. However, section 690.19 of the Code of Civil Procedure was
amended in 1947 by the addition of a new paragraph which provided for
an additional exemption of five hundred dollars, or a proportional amount if
the premiums are in excess of that sum, if the proceeds inure to the benefit
10 Now section 660 of the Probate Code which provides in substance that exempt
property may be set aside to the surviving spouse or minor children at the discretion of
the court.
11 145 Cal. 777, 79 Pac. 534 (1905), 69 L.R.A. 67.
12 Id. at 781, 79 Pac. 536.
13 The law referred to was section 1465 of the Code of Civil Procedure which allows
a court to set aside exempt property at its discretion for the benefit of the surviving
spouse or minor children.
14 Prudential Ins Co. of America v. Beck, 39 Cal. App. 2d 355, 103 P.2d 241 (1940).
15 In re Starr's Estate, 183 Cal. 121, 190 Pac. 625 (1920).
16 175 Cal. 454, 166 Pac. 11 (1917).
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of the insured's spouse or minor child. In a recent decision 7 where deceased
had named a business associate as beneficiary, the court in concluding that
the beneficiary was entitled to the exemption, as has been the law in Cali-
fornia, proceeded further. They stated that since section 690 applied to any
judgment debtor or defendant, and the first paragraph of section 690.19
applied to all moneys, benefits, or privileges, while the second paragraph
provided "in addition to the foregoing" a like exemption for the insured's
spouse or minor children, the section provides a general exemption in favor
of any attachment defendant or judgment debtor with respect to the in-
surance purchased with the first five hundred dollars of premium, and an
additional exemption in favor of the family with respect to the coverage
purchased with the second five hundred dollars. By the amendment the leg-
islature expressed its intention to allow the five hundred dollar exemption
expressed in the first paragraph regardless of to whom the proceeds actually
inure. Any other conclusion would completely nullify the effect of this sec-
ond paragraph. In construing this amendment, the Attorney General stated
that if the insured had no spouse or minor children but all the life insurance
held by him inured to the benefit of other persons, they would be entitled
to the exemption allowed by the first paragraph. 18 When insurance proceeds
are payable to the estate, administrator or executor their benefits ultimately
inure to other persons. To the extent that these benefits accrued or grew out
of life insurance purchased by five hundred dollars annual premium, this
exemption should apply to all policies payable to estate, administrator or
executor regardless of to whom they inured. Hence, although there is author-
ity expressing a contrary view,19 it would appear that these earlier cases
stating that the exemption is only applicable when the proceeds actually
inure to the benefit of a surviving spouse or minor child are no longer law
in California. When the proceeds of insurance policies payable to estate,
administrator or executor do actually inure to the benefit of the surviving
spouse or minor children they should be entitled to the total exemption-that
is, the amount of insurance which is purchased by annual premiums of one
thousand dollars.20 But when the proceeds inure to any other he should be
entitled to the five hundred dollar exemption allowed by the first paragraph
of the statute.
It is a general rule that statutes providing for exemptions should be lib-
erally construed so as to carry out the intention of the legislature and the
humane purpose designed by the lawmakers. The California courts have
followed this rule in their construction of the statute by allowing the exemp-
tion to apply when no specific beneficiary is named but rather the policy is
payable to the estate, administrators or executors, and by allowing the ex-
emption to apply for any beneficiary named regardless of his relationship
with deceased. The courts should follow this rule and allow the exemption
provided in the first paragraph of section 690.19 to be applied to all who
"7 Jackson v. Fisher, 190 Cal. App. 2d 470, 11 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1961).
is 14 Ops. Arr'Y GEm. 50 (1949).
11 E.g., Riesenfeld, Life Insurance and Creditors" Remedies in the United States, 4
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 583, 601 (1957); 21 CAL. Jim. 2d, Exemptions § 22 (1955).
20 This full amount could be set aside by the court through the use of Probate Code
section 660.
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receive the benefits of insurance proceeds payable to the estate, executor or
administrator whether they be the surviving spouse, minor child, or heirs
or devisees of deceased's estate.
Richard 0. Kwapil*
* Member, Second Year class.
